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STUDENT NOTES

THE “MORAL HAZARDS” OF TITLE VII’S RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATION DOCTRINE
STEPHEN GEE*
INTRODUCTION
Legal commentators have been pushing for a stronger employer duty
to accommodate religious beliefs and practices vis-à-vis Title VII for quite
some time. 1 In particular, they have been pushing for that duty to be on par
with an employer’s duty to its disabled workers under Title I of the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”). 2 However, elevating the duty required
under Title VII will have serious consequences by creating a “moral hazard” for employees to “pick and choose” a religion to avoid compliance
with neutral employer rules. Among many other problems, this heightened
duty will most importantly raise constitutional issues, notably the Establishment Clause. 3
Commentators positing that Title VII standards should be in line with
the ADA standards have put forth thorough and well-articulated arguments
on the ideas preventing the Title VII standards from raising, such as neutrality, constitutional concerns, and the Court’s consistent opinion. 4 However, the literature on this subject is one-sided and in dire need of a devil’s
advocate arguing why Title VII standards for reasonable accommodation
and undue hardship should not be elevated to the ADA’s, and further, why
the current standards should not be elevated at all.
Part I of this article chronicles the background of Title VII and the
ADA, along with introducing any other important considerations to the
issue at hand. Part II addresses a recent Seventh Circuit ADA accommoda* Chicago-Kent College of Law, Class of 2014. A tremendous amount of thanks is owed to Professor
Carolyn Shapiro, whose guidance and support helped ensure my voice came out in this note.
1. See, e.g., Keith S. Blair, Better Disabled Than Devout? Why Title VII Has Failed to Provide
Adequate Accommodations Against Workplace Religious Discrimination, 63 ARK. L. REV. 515, 531
(2010).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-92 (excluding P.L. 113-76, 11379, and 113-89)) (effective Jan. 1, 2009).
3. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I
(emphasis added).
4. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 531.
1131

1132

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 89:3

tion decision, which renders nearly all arguments that Title VII and ADA
standards should move together whenever one of them is altered highly
questionable, while also quickly noting how Title VII decisions are rigid in
their application of rules. Part III, the core of this article, posits why Title
VII should not be heightened to the ADA standards represented by the
proposed Workplace Religious Freedom Act (“WRFA”), 5 as well as how
no religious accommodation should be able to trump an employer’s strictly
enforced or provable neutral rule or law of general applicability. Finally,
Part V proposes how aspects of the ADA’s accommodation process and
“best practices” seen in certain Title VII cases can alleviate commentators’
concerns.
I. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the issues pertaining to Title VII religious accommodation claims and ADA accommodation claims, one needs a background on both statutes’ larger schemes and purposes, as well as what
specific provisions within the statutes are important. Furthermore, it is important to understand the non-statutory concerns and issues raised about
accommodations in regard to constitutional issues, choice issues, and so
forth. Finally, summarizing the pertinent Supreme Court cases for both will
help one understand the subject matter herein.
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 mainly to eradicate racial discrimination within the United States. 6 The Act contained multiple
titles to address discrimination in various settings. 7 Title VII of the Act is
aimed at discrimination within the workplace. 8 Most importantly, Title VII
holds that it is unlawful “for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 9 An “employer” under Title VII is essentially anything or anyone

5. S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010); see Nantiya Ruan, Accommodating Respectful Religious Expression in the Workplace, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).
6. Blair, supra note 1, at 521.
7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2012).
8. Id. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
9. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII also applies to employment agencies and labor organizations in
similar ways, but that is beyond the scope of this note. Id. § 2000e-2(b)-(c).

2014]

‘MORAL HAZARDS’ OF TITLE VII

1133

engaged in commerce with at least fifteen employees. 10 Of note, Title VII
includes a provision that affords employers a defense for intentionally discriminating based on religion, national origin, or sex, if there is a bona fide
reason, such as a nondiscriminatory seniority system. 11
Racial discrimination was the impetus for passing the Act and thus little, if any, legislative history was available and reliable on what originally
constituted religious discrimination. 12 Instead, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) was initially the agency charged with
providing guidelines to employers and the courts on religious accommodations. 13 The general view with regard to religion and the workplace has
been that Title VII seeks to prevent an employee from choosing between
his religion and his job if he does not have to. 14
Where an employer has taken an adverse employment action solely
based on an applicant or employee’s religion on its face, Title VII religious
discrimination claims typically have not been “status-based”. 15 Instead,
most religious discrimination claims arise out of a conflict between an employee’s religious belief or practice and an employer’s workplace expectations. 16 In other words, employers were sued for not “accommodating” an
employee’s religion. However, Title VII did not initially place the burden
of accommodating on employers. This was made clear in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co. where the court held that:
Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act do we find any Congressional intent to coerce or compel one person . . . to accommodate the religious beliefs of another. The requirement of [religious]

10. Id. § 2000e(b). Additionally, one should note that the definition of an employee under
§ 2000e(f) has been an area of dispute with regard to meeting the employer requirement. Walters v.
Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202 (1997). Also, please note that this note will not touch upon
non-secular employers (i.e. “churches”) as they are subject to certain exemptions that are beyond the
scope and focus of this note. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
11. Id. § 2000e-2(h). Additionally, religious institutions are accorded an exemption from religious
discrimination claims as to all its requisite human resources decisions. Id. § 2000e-1(a). Furthermore,
religious institutions have a “ministerial exception” which exempts any and all discrimination claims
related to its ministers. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 706-07 (2012).
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The guidelines were last substantively updated in 1980 and can be
found at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1605.1-.3 (2012).
14. See, e.g., Alan D. Schuchman, Note, The Holy and the Handicapped: An Examination of the
Different Applications of the Reasonable-Accommodation Clauses in Title VII and the ADA, 73 IND.
L.J. 745, 757 (1998).
15. Blair, supra note 1, at 546.
16. Id.
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accommodation . . . is contained only in the EEOC Regulations, which in
our judgment are not consistent with the Act. 17

In response to Dewey, Senator Jennings Randolph successfully pushed
forth an amendment to Title VII in 1972, which burdens employers with
accommodating an employee’s religious beliefs or practices. 18 As a result,
Congress amended the definition of “religion” under Title VII to make an
employer also liable for religious discrimination from failure to accommodate “unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance
or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 19
In order for an employee to bring a Title VII religious discrimination
claim based on a failure to accommodate, he must establish a prima facie
case of religious discrimination by showing:
(1) [H]e had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted
with an employment duty; (2) he informed his employer of the belief and
conflict; and (3) the employer threatened him with or subjected him to
discriminatory treatment, including discharge, because of his inability to
fulfill the job requirements. 20

With regard to the bona fide religious belief, the courts have made a
compromise in handling Title VII religious accommodation cases by not
inquiring into the validity of a plaintiff’s alleged religious bona fide belief
or practice in any significant way, and instead focusing on the reasonableness of the accommodation. 21 If the plaintiff is successful, the burden then
shifts to the employer to prove he “initiated good faith efforts to reasonably
accommodate the employee’s religious practices.” 22 If the employer’s ef17. 429 F.2d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971),
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006), as recognized in Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827
F.2d 1081, 1087 (6th Cir. 1987).
18. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012)).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
20. E.g., Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993).
21. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004) (ruling whether
plaintiff’s membership to the Church of Body Modification was a bona fide religious practice protected
by Title VII was not necessary since defendant established reasonable accommodations would have
imposed undue hardship); Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 361-62 (1997). Cloutier’s church
is all online and formed in 1999, has roughly 1000 members, and its mission statement is “to grow as
individuals through body modification and its teachings, to promote growth in mind, body and spirit,
and to be confident role models in learning, teaching, and displaying body modification.” Cloutier, 390
F.3d. at 129; see Mission Statement, CHURCH OF BODY MODIFICATION, http://uscobm.com/missionstatement/ (last visited May 2, 2014).
22. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004); see Sarah Abigail Wolkinson, Comment, A Critical Historical and Legal Reappraisal of Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.:
Judicial Emasculation of the Duty of Accommodation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1185, 1190-91 (2010).
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forts do not result in an accommodation that the employee feels eliminates
the conflict, then the employer must prove that reasonably accommodating
the employee would cause an undue hardship. 23 If the employer successfully proves undue hardship, then he is excused from liability. 24
Since the 1972 amendment, Congress has not enacted legislation further elaborating upon what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation” and
“undue hardship,” despite numerous other amendments made to Title VII. 25
Instead, the Court and EEOC have had to determine what each means. Despite no clear definition from the Court on what a “reasonable accommodation” is, the Court has held that once an employer proves he “has offered a
reasonable accommodation to the employee” which resolves the religious
conflict, then he has fulfilled his duty. 26 Furthermore, despite EEOC objections, 27 an employer does not need to offer multiple reasonable accommodations or accept a proposed accommodation from the employee if the
employer has already offered a reasonable accommodation.28 Finally, in
relation to defining reasonable accommodation, there is some disagreement
between courts on whether the accommodation must “eliminate” or “resolve” the religious conflict. 29
Unlike reasonable accommodation, the Court has defined “undue
hardship” as being when an employer would “bear more than a de minimis
cost” in order to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religion. 30 However, this definition left very little guidance to the lower courts. The various
federal circuit courts have articulated a variety of different standards. 31
However, the biggest disagreement among the circuit courts is whether any
standard can be proven with a factual hypothetical posed by an employer or
whether actual factual evidence is required. 32

23. Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 1190.
24. Id.
25. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071
(codified as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-5, 2000e-16 (2012)); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, 7 (codified as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-16
(2012)).
26. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986).
27. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c) (2012).
28. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69.
29. See id. at 69-70.
30. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
31. Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 1191-92.
32. Id.
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According to many commentators, failure to accommodate claims
arise in three different ways that represent the general scope of the issue: 33
employer scheduling, whether it is for a certain day of the week, 34 certain
days during the year, 35 or daily prayer conflicts; 36 employer grooming requirements, whether for safety37, employer’s public image 38, or uniformity; 39 and religious attire conflicts similar to the grooming ones. 40
Alternatively, courts analyzed the scope of the issue based on whether the
timing of the employer’s implementation of the conflicting facially neutral
policy was before 41 or after 42 the plaintiff-employee started working for the
employer. 43
33. Not included, or particularly relevant in the three types, is a special case that only arises when
an employer becomes unionized and an employee alleges their faith opposes paying union dues. Yott v.
N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979). Initially, the most complicated of the types due
to Establishment Clause and contract rights issues, courts have generally come to agree the only accommodation available is if the employee pays the same amount of dues to a charity that is chosen by
the employee, the union, or both. See id. at 906; Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.
1978); see also Reed v. Intl. Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., 569
F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding payment of dues to one of three charitable organizations was a reasonable accommodation of religious objector’s faith).
34. Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996).
35. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
36. See Elmenayer v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 318 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003); Knight v. Conn.
Dept. of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Berry v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642
(9th Cir. 2006).
37. See, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding Sikh employee’s beard would compromise OSHA safety standards if allowed to maintain role as machinist
surrounded by toxic gases).
38. EEOC v. Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding employer’s
conditioning Sikh applicant’s employment on shaving his beard was valid as clean shaven appearance
was a bona fide qualification of a manager in family restaurant).
39. See, e.g., Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1993).
40. See Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title VII
and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 746 (1996).
41. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (analyzing a seniority system
in a collective bargaining agreement).
42. See Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15-16 (D. Mass. 2006) (grooming
policy).
43. See Piraino v. Intl. Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274-76 (7th Cir. 1996). In some
disparate treatment claims, plaintiffs can present circumstantial evidence of an employer’s “suspicious
timing” of implementing a new employment policy, which if proven, the defendant-employer must
rebut. This “suspicious timing” evidence is the basis for a potential new burden upon employers in
accommodation cases where the conflicting policy is implemented after the plaintiff-employee had been
working for the employer for some time. As to when the policy is implemented before, a unique consideration of whether the unclean hands defense, which in employment contexts includes lying or withholding important information on a resume or in an interview, should be allowed narrowly only for an
employer in a failure to accommodate suit. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352,
360-61 (1995). With regards to this note, I do not address blatant purposeful lies, but only an applicant
who withholds important information. An employer would be ill advised to ask or require someone to
divulge certain personal information, such as religious belief during an interview or in a job posting.
See Best Practice for Eradicating Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/best_practices_religion.html (last modified July 23, 2008). However,
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B. The ADA
Congress passed the ADA in 1990 largely in order to counteract disability discrimination in private-sector employment by expounding upon the
foundations of the prior Rehabilitation Act.44 In the ADA’s findings section, Congress made clear that until 1990, disabled individuals had no legal
recourse for discrimination based on their disability, unlike religious discrimination, and as a result of disability discrimination, the United States
had spent “billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and non-productivity.” 45 The ADA covers discrimination in various settings, but Title I of the ADA is relevant to disability discrimination
in the workplace. 46 As such, it is unlawful for any covered entity 47 to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 48
Of the different types of ADA discrimination claims, an employee
seeking a “failure to accommodate a disability” claim must establish:
(1) [He] is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2)
an employer covered by the statute had notice of his disability; (3) with
asking whether one can work on certain days and at certain times is perfectly legal as long as the questions are pertinent to the job. Therefore, if an employee lies or errs in response to one of these questions
and is subsequently hired and then informs the employer of the lie or error, an employer is placed in a
difficult position that may not be easily remedied. See Crider v. Univ. of Tenn., Knoxville, No. 11–
5511, 2012 WL 3002756, at *8-10 (6th Cir. July 23, 2012) (McKeague, Cir. J., dissenting). The inquiry
is again beyond the scope of this article, but under a failure to accommodate situation, if during discharge the employer lacks the discriminatory animus that has been seen in other cases, it may follow
that upon hiring the misleading employee, he bears all the burden and risk. In this scenario, the employee has everything to gain with the only risk being terminated from a position she knew she could not
fulfill at the outset. See id.
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2009); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed,
Something Blue: Why Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 603 n.1 (2001);
Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2010).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a); see Vande Zande v. Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir.
1995) (finding ADA is meant to benefit the economy by ensuring accommodation costs employer’s
bear are outweighed by productivity gains from disabled employees).
46. §§ 12111-12117.
47. § 12111(2). The definition for employer is in the same section as well. Id.
48. § 12112(a). For the purposes of this article, an employee-plaintiff is assumed to have a “disability,” § 12102(1), § 12102(2) (“Major Life Activities”), § 12102(3) (regarded as having such an
impairment), § 12102(4) (Rules of construction regarding the definition of disability), and be a “qualified individual,” § 12111(8), under the ADA in order to fairly compare Title VII to the ADA. Examples
of disabilities that are covered include diseases such as diabetes, Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp.
& Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2009), and physical limitations resulting from injury on the job or
from birth, among others. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 391 (2002) (back pain);
EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 762 (7th Cir. 2012) (injured arm). Finally, it should be
noted the EEOC provides administrative guidelines on compliance with the ADA, as well as enforcing
the ADA. § 12117(a); § 12116.
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reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such
accommodations. 49

Notice to an employer results in the employer learning the employee
has a disability and wants an accommodation. 50 The notice does not need to
be explicit and does not even need to come from the employee himself.
Determining when and how the employer has the minimal requisite notice
typically is an easy inquiry of what information was available to the employer, whether it be the employee’s statements, various records such as
job performance evaluation, or simply a third party bringing a concern
about the employee to the manager’s attention. 51
Reasonable accommodation is not statutorily defined; instead, the
statute simply gives a few examples of accommodations:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible . . . and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 52

Once notice is given, the “interactive process” required by the ADA
becomes crucial in determining a reasonable accommodation.53 If notice
has been established, and if any of the parties refuses to engage in good
faith bargaining over the accommodation, the opposite party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 54 An employee is not entitled to their preferred accommodation, only one that is reasonable and allows him to work
comfortably and on par with other non-disabled workers. 55 While the employee lacks the right to choose his accommodation, he does have the right
49. McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2009); see
§ 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B); Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 838-39 (7th Cir. 2012).
50. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir. 1999) (“stating that [w]hat
matters under the ADA are not formalisms about the manner of the request, but whether the employee
or a representative for the employee provides the employer with enough information that, under the
circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of both the disability and desire for an accommodation.”).
51. John E. Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, What Is Reasonable Accommodation Under
the ADA? Not an Easy Answer; Rather A Plethora of Questions, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 67, 77-78 (2009).
52. § 12111(9).
53. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2012).
54. See Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding employer was entitled to
summary judgment since employee failed to provide employer with requested details about disability);
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 806 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that “an employer cannot
sit behind a closed door and reject the employee’s requests for accommodation without explaining why
the requests have been rejected or offering alternatives.”).
55. Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2012).
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to an explanation as to why his proposed accommodation is not reasonable. 56 Finally, the EEOC has created regulations that the employer must
consider with regard to the accommodation, which ensures the fulfillment
of the “essential job function.” 57
Outside of facially valid, bad-faith assertions, whether an employer
failed to accommodate depends upon whether the reasonable accommodation required would impose an undue hardship upon an employer. 58 Undue
hardship is defined as “requiring significant difficulty or expense” on the
employer based on factors laid out in the statute, such as the accommodation’s cost, size of the employer, and industry the employer is in. 59
Unlike Title VII, the ADA does not contain an explicit provision exempting liability on the basis of a seniority provision or similar neutral
workplace rules of general applicability akin to a collective-bargaining
agreement. 60 With regard to hiring practices, employers can only request
information about or test certain physical and mental capacities if the inquiry is requested of all applicants and is essential to the job-related functions. 61
C. Other Considerations for Religious Discrimination
While discrimination based on religion is similar to race, color, national origin, sex and disability, religion involves unique considerations and
differs from the others in a few ways. All of the considerations essentially
involve a balancing of the employee and employer interests. 62 Though status claims can arise with all of bases for discrimination, religion is the least
likely to be provable since most religious discrimination claims involve
minority faiths with small numbers which, sans direct evidence, are hard to
prove by implication. 63 The right to reasonable accommodation is only
afforded to religion and disability. 64

56. See Sears, 417 F.3d at 807.
57. Hoppe, 692 F.3d at 838 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2012)).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2009).
59. Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (2011).
60. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 420 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that
“[n]othing in the ADA insulates seniority rules from the ‘reasonable accommodation’ requirement, in
marked contrast to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, each of which has an explicit protection for seniority.”).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2009) (relating to medical examinations and inquiries); see 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.15(b)-(c) (“requirement is job-related and consistent with business necessity”).
62. See Engle, supra note 21, at 361; § 12111(9)-(10).
63. See Jamar, supra note 40, at 720-21.
64. Blair, supra note 1, at 531.

1140

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 89:3

The extent of the accommodation and standards applied to disability is
more burdensome on employers than religion under Title VII. Why the
ADA is more burdensome than Title VII has been the subject of many academic articles that revolve around the topics of choice, 65 neutrality, 66 constitutional issues,67 meaning of accommodation in both contexts, 68 and
religion in general. 69
The Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment with respect to state employers, are acknowledged
as potential barriers to further burdening employers under Title VII akin to
the ADA. Many commentators argue the current Title VII accommodations
already are preferential, Free Exercise is important enough to negate any
Establishment clause issues, or both. 70
Commentators on Heightened Title VII standards admit one’s religion
is a choice, unlike disability. 71 However, once someone makes their choice,
scholars feel it is a permanent part of how people identify themselves and,
as such, is a moot difference between disability and religious accommodations analysis. 72
D. Relevant Supreme Court Holdings on Reasonable Accommodation
In light of the academically written articles, an understanding of the
three seminal Supreme Court cases on reasonable accommodation for both
the ADA and Title VII is necessary.
In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, Plaintiff Hardison worked in an
around-the-clock Trans World Airlines (“TWA”) maintenance department
and was a follower of a faith that observed the Sabbath by not working
from sunset on Friday until sunset on Saturday. 73 When Hardison decided
to transfer buildings within the facility, he became a junior employee subject to a seniority list. This designation meant he would be forced to violate
the Sabbath when other employees went on vacation. 74 Despite the union,
65. Id. at 546-48.
66. See Engle, supra note 21, at 358-59.
67. See Robert A. Sedler, Essay: The Protection of Religious Freedom Under the American
Constitution, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 817, 817-20 (2007).
68. See Malloy, supra note 44, at 624-25.
69. See Blair, supra note 1, at 515.
70. Id. at 548-55; Schuchman, supra note 14, at 757-59.
71. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 546-47.
72. See, e.g., id. at 547 (“That choice may be a conscious choice made because of attending
worship services or some life-changing experience. The decision can be a choice that is made over time,
as when a person is born into a particular religion. In any event, a choice is ultimately made.”)
73. 432 U.S. 63, 67 (1977).
74. Id. at 68.
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TWA, and Hardison’s best efforts, no deal was reached, and Hardison was
subsequently terminated for insubordination and filed his claim. 75
Hardison’s failure to accommodate claim reached the Supreme Court
in 1977. The Court held for the employer and union since Title VII was
meant to eliminate discrimination in employment. Additionally, in light of
the 1972 amendment that defined religion under Title VII, “[i]t would be
anomalous to conclude that by ‘reasonable accommodation’ Congress
meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some
employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to
accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others.” 76 Regarding the 1972
amendment by Senator Randolph and its legislative history, the Court
found nothing in it that would “require an employer to discriminate against
some employees in order to enable others to observe their Sabbath.” 77 The
Court found anything more than a de minimis cost would constitute an undue hardship. 78
In Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, a unionized teacher with
the same faith as Hardison, brought a claim against his school for not accepting either of his proposals for accommodating his religion. 79 The Court
ruled for the school because it had offered a reasonable accommodation of
allowing unpaid leave for days the teacher needed to take off for religious
reasons. 80 In reviewing its interpretation of § 701(j) 81 in Hardison, the
Court renewed its holding that the 1972 amendment and legislative history
“is of little help in defining the employer’s accommodation obligation.” 82

75. For all intents and purposes, the union, TWA, and Hardison, came to an impasse. The union
would not allow the violation of seniority provisions for a forced job swap of an unwilling employee
without allowing other employees to bid on the swap to get overtime pay, and TWA was not willing to
accept a four day a week proposal since the department Hardison worked in always required being fully
staffed. Id. at 68-69.
76. Id. at 81.
77. Id. at 85.
78. Id. at 84. Since the decision in 1977, Congress has yet to successfully amend Title VII to
overcome the pivotal ruling that a religious reasonable accommodation can never trump a strictly
enforced neutral law or rule of general applicability such as a seniority system within a collectivebargaining agreement. See id. at 79-81. The Court discusses how the inclusion of the seniority provision
in Title VII was indicative of how no accommodation could involve being exempt. Id.
79. The school denied both proposals because either one would represent an exception to a strictly enforced neutral policy of allowing employees to utilize paid contractual days off for certain reasons
and not allowing teachers to pay substitute teachers directly on other certain days off. 479 U.S. 60, 6365 (1986); see United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding school accommodating Muslim teacher by allowing her to wear her religious garb would impose
undue hardship by violating a state law prohibiting public school teachers from wearing anything
denoting that the teacher is part of a religious sect).
80. 479 U.S. at 70-71.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2012).
82. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986).
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Thus the Court held an employee is not entitled to the accommodation of
their choice and “an employer has met its obligation under § 701(j) when it
demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee.” 83
In 2002, the Supreme Court faced an ADA failure to accommodate
claim in U.S. Airways v. Barnett, where an employee was reassigned to the
mailroom post-injury, but later, despite requesting an accommodation to be
allowed to maintain in the mailroom, he lost the position when it became
subject to a seniority provision. 84 The situation was akin to Hardison and
Philbrook wherein the accommodation requested was for the employer to
make a personal exception to a neutral rule or law of general applicability,
except here there was no collective bargaining agreement. 85
The Court had to interpret the purposes of the ADA and determine to
what extent employers were supposed to accommodate. 86 In response to the
employer arguing that strictly enforced neutral workplace rules of general
applicability can never be trumped, the Court held that an ADA accommodation in certain instances, if proven by a plaintiff, would trump the strictly
enforced neutral rule and not impose undue hardship.87 The Court ruled the
collective-bargaining aspect of Hardison and Philbrook were not distinguishing factors in its ruling. Instead, it held unilaterally, uniformly applied
and imposed rules and policies require the same analysis as if there were a
collective bargaining agreement. 88 Though the Court ultimately held for the
employer since the seniority system was strictly enforced, 89 it ruled that
unlike Title VII, ADA plaintiffs’ accommodations may be preferential.
This was because the ADA’s purpose and findings are more explicit than
Title VII in regards to accommodations, and the ADA lacks similar Title
VII seniority-system limitations which Congress was likely to be privy to
because the ADA was written based on Title VII language. 90
II. WHERE THE STANDARDS ARE TODAY
Both ADA and Title VII reasonable accommodation and undue hardship standards have changed since their respective enactments. Whereas
83. Id.
84. For five months, U.S. Airways allowed him to keep his role while investigating the matter,
but decided not to allow an exception. 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002).
85. Id. at 403.
86. Id. at 394-403.
87. Id. at 397-98.
88. Id. at 403.
89. Id. at 405.
90. See id. at 397-403.
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Title VII’s has become more pragmatic in attempting to apply rigid rules of
the past, 91 the ADA burden continues to rise with no indication of leveling
off in light of a recent Seventh Circuit opinion representing a trend of certain ADA accommodations becoming potentially mandated. 92 As a result,
any argument for the ADA and Title VII standards to move step-in-step
with each other is highly questionable due to significant Establishment
Clause concerns for Title VII. 93
In EEOC v. United Airlines, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had
to determine whether the ADA could mandate “employers to appoint employees who are losing their current positions due to disability to a vacant
position for which they are qualified.” 94 Circuit Court Judge Richard D.
Cudahy recognized Barnett’s ultimate holding, but found that the Court
specifically pointed out that a “plaintiff . . . nonetheless remains free to
show that special circumstances warrant a finding that, despite the presence
of a seniority system . . . the requested ‘accommodation’ is ‘reasonable’ on
the particular facts.” 95 As a result, Judge Cudahy found that Barnett created
a two-step process in evaluating whether an accommodation would not
impose undue hardship by violating an otherwise strictly enforced neutral
rule or law of general applicability. 96 Judge Cudahy remanded the case to
determine whether a mandated reassignment passes the Barnett two-step
analysis. 97 Furthermore, his dicta notably rejected the purported United
Airlines preferential transfer policy as being a reasonable accommodation
on its face and that ultimately “[w]hile employers may prefer to hire the
best qualified applicant, the violation of a best-qualified selection policy

91. Compare Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D. Mass. 2006), with EEOC v.
Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981). In Brown, the court emphasizes how prior
black line rulings from circuit courts may have been more on decisional grounds and thus courts should
read rulings narrowly. 419 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
92. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that in light of the
Barnett case, “the ADA does indeed mandate that an employer appoint employees with disabilities to
vacant positions for which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily
reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that employer”).
93. See id. at 761; James M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free Exercise, and Title VII: Reconsidering
Reasonable Accommodation, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 525, 537 (2004).
94. 693 F.3d at 761.
95. Id. at 763 (citing U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405 (2002)).
96. Step one is to determine if the accommodation, which is violative of a strictly enforced neutral rule, would be reasonable “in the run of cases.” If so, then step two determines “if there are factspecific considerations particular to [defendant-employer’s situation] that would render [the accommodation] unreasonable.” Id.
97. Id. at 764-65; see id. at 763 n.1; cf. Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir.
2007).
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does not involve the property-rights and administrative concerns (and resulting burdens) presented by the violation of a seniority policy.” 98
The most crucial takeaway from this case is that a disabled employee’s accommodation could trump a strictly enforced neutral rule of general
applicability if he can prove in the run of cases it is not unreasonable (e.g.,
not “requiring significant difficulty or expense”) and even if it is, he still
can prove his specific circumstances would not.99 If a religious employee
were ever accorded such preference under Title VII, § 701(j)’s constitutionality would be highly questionable since the government would become
significantly entangled in almost every private business in America. Additionally, any strictly enforced policy could be subject to judicial scrutiny in
which an employee may be exempted solely based on his religion. 100 However, no commentator is seeking such heightened standards for Title VII. 101
Title VII religious accommodations cases continue a trend of moving
away from drawing stark lines and rules to becoming more pragmatic in its
case review, but the courts have struggled in rigidly applying precedential
rules. Representative of this difficulty are United States v. New York Transit Authority 102 and Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 103 two cases out of the
First Circuit involving employees whose personal appearance did not conform to their employer’s generally applied neutral rule. Both cases call into
question the broad-based rule from the circuit precedent of Cloutier v.
Costco Wholesale Corp., which held an employee seeking “an outright

98. United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764. The preferential transfer policy (the accommodation) that
gave preference (i.e. guaranteed interview and priority over another “equally qualified” candidate) to
recently disabled employees in seeking reassignment through an admittedly “competitive process.” See
id. at 761-62.
99. See, e.g., id. at 762-65; Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (hearing
en banc); Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (hearing en banc).
100. See McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860-64 (2005). Justice Souter’s opinion in
this case deals with the presence of the Ten Commandments on state property in various forms, but
what is significant from this opinion is the concern of what would happen if larger religions received
preferential treatment within the workplace. This note acknowledges no commentator aspiring for such
treatment to any religion, but implied in seeking more protection for religious practices within the
workplace there is always a risk, though admittedly weak, that it could lead to a slippery slope. Additionally, whereas disabled employees’ accommodations will cost money, most accommodations for
religion do not, and so the issue of what constitutes a “significant difficulty” (undue hardship standard
for the ADA) under Title VII may be issuesome.
101. Ms. Wolkinson’s article could be read as requiring something akin to such a standard; however, her point in rebuking the Bhatia safety decision is simply to propose a business necessity standard
for employers to prove undue hardship would come of an accommodation. Wolkinson, supra note 22, at
1206-08.
102. No. 04–CV–4237(SLT)(MDG), 2010 WL 3855191 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010).
103. 419 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D. Mass. 2006).
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exemption from a neutral dress code ‘would be an undue hardship because
it would adversely affect the employer’s public image.’” 104
In New York Transit Authority, the issue was whether exempting Sikh
and Muslim transit employees from the transit authority dress code, specifically as to wearing their turbans and khirmars in place of transit authority
official headwear, would place undue hardship upon the transit authority. 105
Despite years of negotiations resulting in an agreement that the plaintiffemployees could wear their turbans and khirmars as long as they matched
the transit authority uniform colors, the plaintiffs still refused to place the
transit authority logo on their headwear. 106 The transit authority filed for
summary judgment relying on Cloutier’s holding that seemingly barred
ultimatums. 107 The court found Cloutier wholly inapplicable since the employees were not seeking a complete exemption from the policy as they had
agreed to wear headwear that matched the uniforms. 108 Furthermore, the
court held Cloutier was only applicable where the employee made no effort
to compromise or where the only accommodation possible was a complete
exemption, but in the latter situation the employer-defendant still needed to
prove the exemption would place undue hardship upon it.109 In the end, the
court ruled the case may continue and the transit authority’s motion for
summary judgment was denied. 110
In Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., the court ruled on whether an oilchange employee, who never shaved or cut his hair based on his Rastafarian religion, was reasonably accommodated when his employer moved him
to the lower bay, denying him the customer interaction he had before the
employer implemented its new grooming policy. 111 The Rastafarian employee sought an exemption from the new policy so that he could have his
desired client interaction and not be relegated to the cold and isolated lower
bay. The court, bound by Cloutier, ruled for the defendant that the reassignment to the lower bay was a reasonable accommodation. 112
104. Id. at 15 (citing Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 136 (1st Cir. 2004)); see
Part II infra for more detail on this case.
105. 2010 WL 3855191, at *1.
106. Id. at *8. This case is likely representative of the employer policy existing before the employees were hired, but focusing on this aspect is unimportant since the original policy employees were
subject to has been modified through negotiations between the transit authority and the religious employees.
107. See id. at *19.
108. See id. at *20-21.
109. See id.
110. Id. at *23.
111. See 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9-11 (D. Mass. 2006). This is a textbook case of how an employer’s
policy was implemented after the employee had already been working there.
112. See id. at 15-20.
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In ultimately holding as it did, the court went to great lengths to make
clear Cloutier should be very narrowly construed and that Cloutier standards for proving undue hardship in personal-appearance cases was too stark
and in need of flexibility. 113 The opinion makes clear that affording a private employer the virtual affirmative defense of “public image” without
any evidence weighs too heavily on the employee’s religion.114 Therefore,
it found Cloutier should be read as an employee’s take-it-or-leave-it accommodation demand from an appearance policy places undue hardship
because of the precedent set by the demand, but the case should not be read
as granting a company’s “insistence on virtually complete autonomy in
shaping its public image.” 115
The rest of the opinion voices its concerns with how “employer’s
preferences, or . . . prejudices,” in maintaining a certain “public image” are
given significant weight as long as his policy is facially neutral.116 Commentators in favor of raising the Title VII burdens on employers have
brought up this relevant issue with regard to situations like Brown. 117 The
employer’s grooming policy in Brown does not qualify as a strictly enforced neutral policy because it was adopted after the plaintiff had worked
there for some time. Therefore, when an employer institutes a new neutral
policy of general applicability that conflicts with current employees’ religious beliefs or practices, the employer should have a more significant
burden to prove 118 undue hardship than in cases where the employer policy

113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 17.
116. See id. at 15-20. The best quote to sum up the district court’s uneasiness of the First Circuit
standards is:
The proper balancing of bona fide religious practices against an employer’s policy decisions
remains a difficult issue, as the struggles exhibited by these cases demonstrate. Still, it is a
matter of concern when the balance appears to tip too strongly in favor of an employer’s preferences, or perhaps prejudices. An excessive protection of an employer’s “image” predilection encourages an unfortunately (and unrealistically) homogeneous view of our richly varied
nation. Worse, it places persons whose work habits and commitment to their employers may
be exemplary in the position of having to choose between a job and a deeply held religious
practice. It is unclear whether the decision being made in this memorandum strikes the balance properly, but there is no question that it is compelled by controlling authority.
Id. at 18-19.
117. See Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 1205-06.
118. What “prove” should mean in terms of an evidentiary burden or burden of proof involves
topics beyond the scope of this article, but I will say an employer can “prove” undue hardship by showing the new neutral policy of general applicability was adopted based on something akin to a consultant’s analysis and recommendation like in Brown as opposed to asserting a mere “public image”
defense without further elaboration.
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pre-dated the plaintiff’s employment. 119 The First Circuit’s judicial standards are more pro-employer than other circuits that require more. 120 While
this case may seem counter to a “neutral rule” thesis, Title VII cases are
extremely fact intensive. If this case were tried in a different circuit, the
plaintiff might win since the facts do not indicate a rise in business after the
employee was relegated to the lower bay. 121
III. WHY TITLE VII RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS SHOULD NOT TRUMP A
STRICTLY ENFORCED OR PROVABLE NEUTRAL RULE OR LAW OF GENERAL
APPLICABILITY
This part of the article serves as a “devil’s advocate” to a WRFA proposal and commentators, suggesting the Title VII and ADA standards for
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” should be the same at
the ADA levels. Both statutes involve highly fact-intensive inquiries, 122
where subjective context and the circuit the case is tried in may vary the
amount of protection afforded. However, from a comprehensive point of
view, a religious accommodation cannot trump a strictly enforced or provable neutral rule or law of general applicability without imposing undue
hardship, while a disability accommodation can. 123 Therefore, Title VII
119. The burden upon the employer based on whether the conflicting policy implementation
happened before or after plaintiff’s employment is based on the employee’s “choice” to become a tenet
of a certain faith covered in supra Part III(C).
120. See Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 1191-92. Wolkinson points out, for example, the different
standards for de minimis costs in the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth.
121. See Brown, 319 F. Supp. 2d. at 9-11. In Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the attorney
pointed out how the “no beard policy” had any real effect on business, and even if it did, the employer
could not point to anything concrete. Specifically, the brief said:
F.L. Roberts claims now that the personal appearance policy change was a change which increased revenues. However, when pressed to provide facts to support this claim, the defendant
admits that it does not know whether the “no beard” policy had any bearing on sales from the
2002-2002 year, or whether it was other changes, like a new sales model, which led to any increase. Mr. Smith has admitted that, as a point of fact, he cannot prove that the “no beard”
rule had any impact at all. As to customer feedback on the appearance of employees, Mr.
Smith can only state that “more than one” person over an eighteen month period commented
on the personal appearance of Jiffy Lube personnel.
Brief for Petitioner, Brown v. F.L. Roberts, 2005 WL 6259501 (D.Mass. 2006) (No. 04-30105-MAP).
Part V of this article deals with the disconnect between circuits to propose an ideal set of burdens on the
parties in order to ensure employees do not have to choose between their faith and job, while still
maintaining a neutral governmental position and respect for employers’ and coworkers’ rights.
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)-(10) (2012); Berry v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th
Cir. 2006) (Title VII).
123. See U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 398 (2002); Engle, supra note 21, at 360 (holding
that “[d]espite all the shifts that have occurred over the years in Title VII religious accommodation
doctrine, which are discussed in this Part, courts have had a difficult time requiring employers to make
exceptions to their ‘neutral’ rules.”). As discussed in Section II, the Seventh Circuit recently held a
disabled employee might be entitled to an accommodation that trumps an employer‘s otherwise strictly
enforced neutral rule of general applicability. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir.
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accommodations should always be held unreasonable and thus impose an
undue hardship whenever it would trump a strictly enforced 124 or provable
neutral rule or law of general applicability. 125
The reasons for why the two statutes should not afford the same
amount of protection to employees or, put another way, to burden the employers and coworkers, range from the economic to the judicial-legislative
interactions that imply constitutional concerns with the Establishment
Clause. Most of these reasons are addressed by heightened Title VII standards’ commentators. However, these commentators either did not address
or glossed over one common theme throughout most of the reasons why the
line of “neutrality” must never be crossed: 126 the potential for “moral hazards,” as defined as incentivizing people to become “religious” solely for
the preferential treatment and safeguards afforded by the government, resulting from the heightened standards interplay with how Title VII accommodation cases are judicially handled. 127

2012); see supra Part II. This potential “mandate” to employers in certain instances as applied in Title
VII religious accommodations is analogous to a Connecticut statute that was held unconstitutional in
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985). The important part of the statute was: “No person
who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer
to work on such day. An employee’s refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his
dismissal.” Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 706. Under Title VII, such a mandate would fail under the
Lemon v. Kurtzmann test, which courts use for Establishment Clause violation inquiries like in Caldor.
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Id. Regardless of the first part of
the test, the highly preferential mandate language would primarily promote religion in its effects due to
the strong governmental entanglement with private and state employers’ ability to operate and their
right to craft neutral workplace policies to avoid conflicts between fellow workers and the company or
state itself. See Caldor, 472 U.S. at 712 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Therefore, if Title VII standards
adopted the mandate option the ADA potentially could gain, then there is a substantial chance the
altered § 701(j) provision could not withstand an Establishment Clause challenge. See Oleske, supra
note 93, at 537. Since the ADA standards only recently changed, utilizing the newfound ADA standard
as the one commentators seek Title VII to be like is unfair and thus this article will be comparing Title
VII’s standard to the preferential, yet non-mandatory ADA standards on par with what was adopted in
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007), or the
thirteen-time-proposed WRFA. S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010).
124. As a reminder, strictly enforced means the policy is enforced so consistently as to create an
implied contractual right to every employee of consistent performance, which if breached would require
a remedy to the harmed employee.
125. As a side note, plaintiffs are always able to prove the employer’s supposed “neutral policy” is
either not neutral or not applied consistently. Those types of claims would likely fall under a disparate
treatment (intentional discrimination) cause of action. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973).
126. By “never crossed,” I mean that the spirit of a truly bona fide neutral policy must never be
cast aside in favor of a religious accommodation without more (i.e., mitigation or inconsistent application by employer).
127. Judges refrain from deep inquiry into whether someone’s religious belief is bona fide. See
Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 129 (1st Cir. 2004); Engle, supra note 21, at 362.
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A. Economic Rationale for the ADA Heightened Standards is not Present
for Title VII
Looking to the legislative history of a statute for its purpose is usually
an exercise in “looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends,” 128
but when a statute states its purpose in explicit terms, then the legislature
really was trying to drive the point home. 129 Therefore, when Congress
passed the ADA in 1990, they were signaling to the courts, employers,
employees, and the EEOC, that this law was about more than just antidiscrimination but also about helping the economy. Congress stated:
[T]he continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on
an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity. 130

In contrast, there is no legislative history or related purpose section
within Title VII or any of its amendments advocating any sort of economic
benefit derived from strong religious accommodations on par with the
ADA. The overall purposes served by Title VII and the ADA are incredibly
different.
Some commentators look at how both the ADA and Title VII are alike
in creating economic benefits, but their support is based mostly on the
normative observation that the employer’s intolerance of religion will cause
him to make “economically unsound” judgments just as he does for the
disabled. 131 However, these commentators overlook two things in making
this argument. The ADA was an express act by Congress to root out the
subconscious discrimination of disabled workers while also transferring the
government’s financial burden 132 to private employers to accommodate
them, but only as long as the employer makes a net profit off them. 133 Also,
128. Stanley A. Halpin, Looking over a Crowd and Picking Your Friends: Civil Rights and the
Debate over the Influence of Foreign and International Human Rights Law on the Interpretation of the
U.S. Constitution, 30 HASTINGS INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (citing Sheryl Gay Stolberg &
Adam Liptak, Courts In Transition: The Overview; Roberts Fields Questions on Privacy and Precedents, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 14, 2005, at A1 (Chief Justice Roberts’ comment on legislative history during
his confirmation)).
129. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1769 (2010).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4)(6) (2012).
131. See Blair, supra note 1, at 530; Malloy, supra note 44, at 617-18; Ruan, supra note 5, at 29;
see also Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 1207-08.
132. Social-welfare programs and America’s generally untapped economic productivity of unemployed or underemployed disabled workers. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2012).
133. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995); Malloy, supra
note 44, at 617-18; Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace
Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1272 n.199 (2003).
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since Congress enacted the ADA, studies have shown that companies benefitted as both employers 134 and as manufacturers. 135 To be fair, ADA standards may seem to cost employers a lot of money on their face. However,
studies have shown the average accommodation costing around $500, but
those employers saw a return in the form of savings in the ballpark of
$5,000 from accommodating. 136 However, no substantive economic proof
has been proffered for the idea that raising the Title VII reasonable accommodation to the point of undue hardship at a “significant difficulty or
expense” will take Muslims, Sikhs, Roman Catholics, or any other faiths
off of welfare and cut down on the national debt.
Another economic argument a heightened Title VII standards proponent could make is normative in that the accommodated employee will be
happier and more productive. However, that argument carries equal weight
regardless of whether the employer accommodates an employee’s religion
or something else such as parental commitments. Additionally, one could
argue some ADA accommodations involve time where the disabled worker
might have to leave for doctor appointments. However, unlike asking for
taking the Sabbath off, the disabled employee simply works with his employer to move appointments or other paid time off around each other’s
schedules. Therefore, the lack of a substantive report displaying derived
economic benefits from religious accommodations hampers the cause of
heightened Title VII standards’ commentators. This is especially true since
very few Title VII religion claims are based on invidious discrimination
that could motivate Congress and the electorate to justify economic costs
for the further promotion of religion. But even then, certain religious practices that would be asserted as accommodations are counter-productive to
national policies such as those on drugs. 137
B. Choice or No Choice, too Many Subjective Factors to Allow a Title VII
Accommodation to Trump a Neutral Line
Most heightened Title VII standards commentators deal with the “mutability” issue of religion in adamantly pushing for ADA-level standards. 138
134. See Malloy, supra note 44, at 617-18.
135. See Heidi M. Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act Part II-Patents and Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 9, 18-19 (1998).
136. See Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 377-78 (1997).
137. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding plaintiffs being discharged and subsequently denied unemployment benefits directly as a result of their religious practice of smoking tribal
peyote did not violate their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
138. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 546-48.
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They put forth primarily that one’s religion is immutable, permanent, and
unchangeable like skin color, race, and akin to the specific characteristics
of the disabled as defined by the ADA. 139 However most commentators
cede that religion can be seen as a choice at the point someone devotes
their life to it, yet as time goes on the religion becomes as much a part of
someone as his skin color. 140 Regardless of the commentators’ exercise in
semantics and inquiry into the metaphysical aspects of religion, and whether there is a choice and if it truly becomes permanent, the answers and
views commentators put forth are highly subjective, theoretical, and likely
more informative in a non-legal setting. Simply put, the only important and
relevant answer arising from the commentators’ analysis is that there is an
element of choice for many in their religion. Whether that choice becomes
permanent or not is an inquiry akin to the never-ending debate over whether there is a God. This article assumes most, if not all, people make a
choice to follow a religion, and that at some point, that religious choice
becomes permanent to a point where denial of their beliefs and practices
would be akin to a denial based on any other immutable aspect.
Heightened Title VII standards’ commentators cite religious “choice”
being protected when the Supreme Court ruled in Wisconsin v. Yoder that
an Amish family could withhold their child from attending public school in
contradiction of a compulsory-attendance state law due to their religious
beliefs. 141 However, they forget the ruling was based on a parent’s right to
care for their child as he or she sees fit. 142 More importantly, holding otherwise would result in criminal sanctions being levied against any and all
Amish religious followers with children, which would be a violation of the
Establishment Clause. 143
Allowing the parents in Yoder to exempt their child did not afford
them any preference or special treatment. If the Court had held otherwise,
the parents would have been forced to send their child to school, conforming to society in complete contradiction of their religious tenets.144 If an
employer in a customer-service-driven industry has a neutral rule of being
clean-shaven that is uniformly applied, a Sikh is not forced to work there,
since he is free to work wherever he wants. Whatever other issues com139. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012).
140. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 546-48; Schuchman, supra note 14, at 756-57.
141. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see Jamar, supra note 40, at 771-72.
142. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
143. See id. (“The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents’ practice of the Amish
religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under
threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious
beliefs.”).
144. See id. at 216-18.
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mentators may raise with the Sikh hypothetical may be fair, but no one is
forcing him to choose his job or his religion, if in fact at the outset he knew
his religion forbade him to working under such terms. 145
An often-forgotten point of view in analyzing mutability and its effect
on Title VII is that when someone chooses a religion, he knows what he is
sacrificing. For example, between the ages of 14-16, every Amish child
goes through a Rumspringa wherein he or she leaves home for a period of
time to experience outside culture before deciding whether to devote his or
her entire life to the Amish faith or to leave the community. 146 Those who
choose to be baptized into the Amish faith afterwards knows he or she will
likely never live in a city, own a car, or be able to drink or smoke. 147 Most
children who are raised under a certain faith will at some point have to face
a similar choice, and most know what he or she generally can and cannot
do as a result. He or she makes his or her choice freely, uncompelled by
any legally binding forces. However, if anyone is worth heightened legal
protection of their faith, it is children going through this choice process
since the family and community they grew up in are likely subscribers to
that faith. 148 Adults not raised under any certain faith who choose to become a member of a faith are, for all intents and purposes, free of any legal
forces and most normative defensible (family, community, etc.) sources of
influence. When that adult, like the child, chose, he knew which limits
were being placed upon what he could do with his life if he were to be a
devout member. He likely has an even greater appreciation of the real
world implications of that choice. Therefore, logically and ethically, a religious plaintiff claiming a known, strictly enforced, common neutral rule of
general applicability, forcing him to choose between his faith and his job
unless the claimed “neutral rule” is implemented after he started working
there, seems indefensible. Even then, an employer can make certain accommodations, which do not force a “yes” or “no” as to one’s job. 149
145. A situation wherein the employer adopts a policy after the employee has already been working there is a different situation, and a “neutral rule” cannot be said to have been generally applied if in
fact it was new. See Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D. Mass. 2006) (Rastafarian had
been working in customer service for some time before clean-shaven policy was adopted). The case
involved a franchisee adopting a clean-shaven policy for just his stores, but the franchisor (i.e., the main
entity) did not mandate the policy.
146. Lisa Biedrzycki, “Conformed to This World”: A Challenge to the Continued Justification of
the Wisconsin v. Yoder Education Exception in A Changed Old Order Amish Society, 79 TEMP. L. REV.
249, 252-53 (2006).
147. Id.
148. See Blair, supra note 1, at 546-48.
149. See United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04–CV–4237(SLT)(MDG), 2010 WL
3855191 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010) (holding that Sikh and Muslim transit employees agree to wearing
headwear which matches the transit employer’s uniform); Brown, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (D. Mass. 2006)
(working in lower bay where no client contact is present).
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Another issue with regard to mutability and religion is the highly subjective and individualized nature of each person’s personally held beliefs
based on the institutional religious tenets. 150 Professor Kaminer highlighted
this subjectivity and where “choice” is the largest issue in three types of
cases: “[(1)]where an employee does not follow a traditional institutional
majority religion . . . [(2)] where an employee follows some but not all
church dogma . . . [and (3)] where an employee becomes more observant
over the course of [their] employment and requests additional accommodations.” 151
As to minority faiths, Professor Kaminer is correct in stating that
courts are skeptical of how bona fide the belief is, but incorrect as to her
rationalizing the courts’ denial of accommodations on the basis “of personal choice.” 152 Rather, a lack of communication by the employer, employee,
or both, is more likely the source. For example, in Cloutier v. Costco
Wholesale Corporation, the employee was a member of the Church of
Body Modification and did not indicate her religious beliefs and practices
until after numerous confrontations with management. 153 The court held for
Costco because the employee made an ultimatum in seeking her accommodation as a complete exemption from the company’s neutral policy. 154 Contrast Cloutier with New York City Transit Authority wherein the Sikh and
Muslim employees made a good faith effort to find a compromise. 155 Furthermore, on the issue skepticism regarding minority religions, the courts
compromised in handling Title VII religious accommodation cases by not
inquiring into the validity of a plaintiff’s alleged religious bona fide belief
or practice in any significant way; instead courts focus on the reasonableness of the accommodation. 156

150. See Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Conduct and the Immutability Requirement: Title VII’s
Failure to Protect Religious Employees in the Workplace, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 453, 471 (2010).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 472.
153. 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004). The employee was asked to remove her facial jewelry in keeping with the company policy numerous times, but it was not until later that she informed the employer
of her religious reasons for doing so. Despite a compromise offered by the employer, that she wear clear
retainers in the piercings while at work, the employee refused. Id. at 129-30.
154. Id. at 132-33; see Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2003); Wilson v.
U.S. W. Commc’n, 58 F.3d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1995). The court specifically held, “[w]e find dispositive that the only accommodation Cloutier considers reasonable, a blanket exemption from the nofacial-jewelry policy, would impose an undue hardship on Costco. In such a situation, an employer has
no obligation to offer an accommodation before taking an adverse employment action.” Cloutier, 390
F.3d at 132-33 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
155. United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04–CV–4237(SLT)(MDG), 2010 WL 3855191
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010).
156. See Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 129; Engle, supra note 21, at 362; Kaminer, supra note 150, at 472.
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Professor Kaminer’s second category where the plaintiff only ascribes
to some, but not all, of the church dogma is, according to her, likely the
most widespread. 157 However, Professor Kaminer’s characterization and
understanding of this problem, as courts holding someone’s partial dogmatic belief as not bona fide, is questionable. The issue is actually how each
person “chooses” to practice his bona fide religious beliefs in his own way,
such as a Roman Catholic pharmacist who decides he is going to effectuate
the church’s abstinence stance by refusing to help, talk to, or even
acknowledge anyone who looks like he or she would inquire about contraceptives. 158 Under current Title VII standards, employees are not free to
practice their beliefs to such extremes and the heightened standards commentators are likely not in favor of allowing this type of practice. However,
upon crossing the line of neutral policy, lesser examples become questionable in imposing an undue hardship, such as whether wearing an antiabortion button by any faith imposes an undue hardship within an office
setting, a retail store, a drug store, a warehouse and so forth. 159 Though
work-scheduling and personal-appearance cases may be the primary cases
alluded to by commentators, the pharmacist and button cases are significantly more questionable as to reasonability. In the current workplace,
where so many rights collide, do Americans want to have as politically
divisive topic as religion to gain a potential trump card within the workplace? This area of law is highly sensitive, and the courts have mostly
agreed to skirt over the element of whether the plaintiff’s belief was bona
fide and instead focus on the accommodation. 160 The courts’ compromise
has resulted in a policy of neutrality as to the accommodations that would
be accorded where a strictly enforced generally applied neutral rule of applicability by an employer exists. 161
Professor Kaminer’s view on her final category of “choice” issues,
wherein the employee becomes more devout over time and requests further
accommodations as time progresses, is the one area of “choice” that is
agreeable. 162 An employee who has made a choice to join a religion be157. Kaminer, supra note 22, at 476-77. She cites EEOC v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad
de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2002), as a case displaying how
courts are skeptical of someone’s beliefs when there is evidence of employee conduct contrary to the
tenets of his faith. However, this case seems to turn on the contradictory behavior as providing a justifiable skepticism to how bona fide his anti-union membership belief in light of the fact he denied the
union offered accommodation to the certain parts of union membership he initially sought. See id. at 5657.
158. See Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x. 581 (7th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
159. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’n, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995).
160. See Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 129; Engle, supra note 21, at 362.
161. Kaminer, supra note 150, at 472.
162. Id. at 477-79.
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comes more connected with the faith and community as time goes on. 163 At
the point where the religion conflicts with work in the slightest, the employer will have been put on notice and should be communicating with the
employee about how his newfound faith will impact his work (e.g., holidays, daily practices, and potential work requirements). Therefore, an employee should bring up any potential conflicts, and, depending on the
degree of conflict, the employer can make a good faith effort to accommodate those conflicts (i.e. use vacation day for a non-traditional holiday or
voluntary shift swaps). In a majority of the cases Professor Kaminer alludes
to, there was a lack of communication between parties. 164 Employees who
choose or change their religion as an adult should be aware of the ramifications of their choice, and thus, the employee’s knowledge of potential appearance or scheduling conflicts at the time of choosing a faith should be
crucial in the accommodation inquiry. If a reasonable employee knows
becoming a Sikh would violate Occupational Safety and Health Administration rules at his current job, 165 then he should know his religious choice
likely means he needs to seek a transfer or new job wherein his beard will
not cause compliance or safety issues. 166
Finally, “choice” is not present in the ADA setting, since no sane individual would choose to become disabled. The court adjudicating an ADA
accommodation case can look to objective measurements, such as how
disabled the employee was (e.g., doctors evaluations), what kind of accommodations are available, 167 and whether the minimum requisite accommodation would impose undue hardship.168 While some subjectivity is
still involved, the sources, such as doctors, are held to objective standards
such as being Board Certified. Title VII religious accommodation cases, in
contrast, are more likely to encounter a plethora of subjective choices ranging from why the employer implemented the conflicting policy to the employee’s specific religious practice. Most importantly though, the source of
why there is a need for an accommodation is subject to significantly more
judicial scrutiny under the ADA. A Title VII plaintiff’s choices in why he
practices his specific belief, why a certain religion has certain practices

163. See Blair, supra note 1, at 547-48.
164. Kaminer, supra note 150, at 477-79.
165. Due to him having to grow a beard of which an accommodation to bring the employer in
compliance is either unavailable or significantly expensive.
166. See Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding Sikh employee’s
beard would compromise OSHA safety standards if allowed to maintain role as machinist surrounded
by toxic gases).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012).
168. § 12111(10).
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based on its beliefs, or both, are not subject to significant judicial scrutiny. 169
In closing, “choice” is a significant issue with respect to Title VII accommodations. Consensus says at some point an individual confirms their
religion and thus the reasonable knowledge of career limitations should be
held against them since they freely chose the faith fully understanding
those limitations. Minority religions are fairly dealt with, as courts require
minimal evidence of a bona fide religious belief. Finally, every person’s
right to mold and practice one’s beliefs as one sees best is laudable, but
within the workplace, where many interests conflict, a neutral policy which
is truly generally applied with strict enforcement should not be trumped by
religion.
C. Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison Signaled the 1972
Amendment’s Language was not Strong Enough
Commentators in favor of higher Title VII standards allude to the
1972 congressional amendment to Title VII. 170 Hardison held the amendment, and EEOC guidelines based on the amendment, were of no help in
defining the parameters of the employers’ duty. 171 The legislative history of
the amendment is scant,172 and the actual amendment says nothing about
what exactly a “reasonable accommodation” or “undue hardship”173 is as of
2012, 40 years since it was enacted and 35 years since Hardison was decided. The commentators’ reliance is understandable, but unpersuasive
because Congress never directly replied. With so little to go on, the Court
was walking a “tightrope” in interpreting the 1972 amendment out of fear
that Establishment Clause issues might arise if a worker’s accommodation
would require the violation of a strictly enforced neutral rule of general
applicability in the form of a collectively bargained seniority system. 174 By
holding neutrality principles applied to the accommodation, the Court was
avoiding an Establishment Clause issue, preserving Congress’ legislation,

169. See Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 129 (1st Cir. 2004); Engle, supra note
40, at 361-62.
170. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 523-24.
171. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73-79 (1977).
172. See 118 CONG. REC. 705-06 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
173. See, e.g., Schuchman, supra note 14, at 751-52.
174. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“By preserving doctrinal flexibility and
recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic application of the Religion Clauses ‘we have been able
to chart a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any
semblance of established religion. This is a ‘tight rope’ and one we have successfully traversed.’”).
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and likely signaling to Congress that a higher standard required explicit
language by them and not the EEOC. 175
D. Congress Never Successfully Responded to Hardison, but has Elsewhere
with Mixed Results
From 1996 to 2012, versions of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act
(“WRFA”) were introduced thirteen times in Congress, but little resulted. 176 WRFA adopts the undue hardship language of the ADA into Title
VII, specifically rebukes Hardison, and makes many of the current accommodations typically offered by employers unreasonable. 177 Though
looking to legislative history is not always indicative on legislative intent,
thirteen attempts from 1996 onward, in either the House of Representatives
or Senate, indicates that the national electorate does not want heightened
standards. However, a more viable theory is likely Establishment Clause
concerns since the 1972 amendment has been referred to as the lowhanging fruit of Title VII ripe for invalidation.178 Furthermore, in light of
Congress’s response to Employment Division v. Smith, 179 with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 180 being essentially invalidated subsequently in City of Boerne v. Flores, 181 the Court made it quite clear that further
raising the standard may not only implicate Establishment Clause issues,
but also potentially implicates state sovereign immunity issues via the limits on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as well with respect to Title
VII as applied to public employers. 182
E. “Moral Hazards” with Employees and an Unknowable Effect on Private
and State Employers
The ADA affects roughly 43 million people, 183 whereas Title VII with
respect to religion has an unlimited scope to roughly all 300 million Amer175. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 73-79; see also McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 863
(2005).
176. See, e.g., S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 110th Cong.
(2008); H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1445, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003); S.
2572, 107th Cong. (2002). Many others exist.
177. S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012).
178. See Oleske, supra note 93, at 537.
179. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding plaintiffs being discharged and subsequently denied unemployment benefits directly as a result of their religious practice of smoking tribal peyote did not violate
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
180. Pub. L. No. 103–141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-bb-4 (2012)).
181. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
182. See Oleske, supra note 93, at 536-37, 570-71.
183. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995).
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icans. Some commentators view the 300 million point as misleading because most Title VII claims come from minority religions, which is probably the truth under the current standard. 184 Over the course of our nation’s
history, it’s likely that the traditions of the majority religions (i.e. JudeoChristian faiths except Islam) became embedded in the American workplace to the point where those traditions are assumed to be secular and thus
little, if any, rational accommodation the followers of those large religions
would really push for.185 However, in order to raise the Title VII standards,
Congress will have to raise it as applied to all faiths because the promotion
of specific religions renders the legislation per se invalid under the Establishment Clause. 186
The more “radical” elements of the majority faiths could seek accommodations under this new standard, and the potential for labor unrest seems
high where, for example, a Roman Catholic worker seeks the accommodation of being allowed to wear an anti-abortion button to work. 187 Admittedly, the worker’s accommodation would likely impart undue hardship in a
face-to-face customer-service context, but within a private office context, it
would be a closer question. The employer will not be able to prove the
accommodation places “significant difficulty” upon it since fellow coworker grumblings and uneasiness with a particular view are not enough to
prove undue hardship under the current standards in certain circuits. 188
Worst-case scenario for this situation would be if the employer had a strictly enforced neutral policy of no buttons to be worn, which the Roman
Catholic’s accommodation trumps, and an agnostic worker who wears a
“pro-choice” button in response. The agnostic worker has no protection due
to the employer’s no-button policy, thus showing freedom of religion
trumps freedom of speech. Though knowing the extent to which majority
faiths would have an effect on the workplace is theoretical, the outward
appearance of preferential treatment for those faiths could be more overt
with raised standards than they may currently be under the current standard.
In connection with the majority faith issue is that a “moral hazard” for
employees arises with higher Title VII standards as people could potentially pick and choose certain faiths with the knowledge that they can take
certain days off, wear piercings to work with no worry of an employer’s
184. See Blair, supra note 1, at 535-36.
185. See Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x. 581 (7th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
186. See McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
187. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’n, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995).
188. See, e.g., Crider v. Univ. of Tenn., Knoxville, No. 11–5511, 2012 WL 3002756, at *4 (6th
Cir. July 23, 2012); Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1473 (9th Cir. 1996).
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policy trumping, and as a pharmacist, ignore anyone who looks like they
might inquire about contraceptives among other practices.189 If a 1,000member, online-only church can survive the bona fide belief inquiry, then
anything an employee can practically imagine based off a religious belief is
possible. Thus, would deeper inquiry by the courts into the bona fide belief
be required to stem this “moral hazard?” This highly sensitive issue likely
would create a split among the circuits and thus would probably reach the
Supreme Court where they would have to answer with a standard, or at
least Americans would hope the Court would. In all, a legal and political
mess potentially could ensue if the Court gives no clear standard. As a final
statement on this issue, one must remember under the ADA a plaintiff’s
disability is subject to vast objective inquiry by the courts, whereas the
inquiry under Title VII for religion is highly subjective and a mere formality.
F. Constitutional Issues
In order for Title VII accommodation standards to trump a strictly enforced or provable neutral rule of general applicability, it must not violate
the Establishment Clause. It must also not go beyond the scope of Congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to
public employers.
1. Establishment Clause
Heightened Title VII standards commentators accept that the Establishment Clause is the biggest hurdle the higher standard faces. 190 In any
challenge, the three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman is applicable. 191 The
commentators put forth multiple specific arguments for why a heightened
standard would not fail the test, but ultimately their argument can be generalized as the “accommodation[s] allow [] the government to take steps to
favor religion ‘by allowing it room to exist.’” 192
Commentators base their argument erroneously on what they call the
current “preferential treatment” religion gets in the form of its institutions
receiving tax-exempt status, schools receiving funding from the state, and
189. See Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004).
190. See, e.g., Engle, supra note 21, at 392-93; Jamar, supra note 40, at 770-72.
191. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (“Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from
our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”); see Blair, supra note 1, at 550.
192. See Blair, supra note 1, at 552 (internal quotations omitted).
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exemptions from Title VII in certain regards. 193 The tax-exempt status religious institutions receive has been held by the Court as not violative of the
Establishment Clause because of historical precedent 194 and because “the
government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply
abstains from demanding that the church support the state.” 195 More importantly, the Court has found the tax-exempt status helps promote the
Establishment Clause’s purpose of separation of church and state. 196 As to
state funding of religious schools, the commentators miss how the Court
has found religious school funding constitutional only where the same
funding or tax breaks to parents of religious school children have been
extended to public schools and its parents. 197 Finally, the Title VII exemptions to religious institutions have been recently re-affirmed as nonviolative in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC because without these exemptions, particularly the ministerial exception, the government would become involved in “ecclesiastical decisions”, and a significant concern could arise for more traditional religions
being afforded more deference than minority religions. 198
All three arguments by commentators for a higher standard are erroneous because in all three instances the Court has found the government,
both legislatively and judicially, is doing less to inhibit or promote religion
than the alternative. 199 Not granting religious institutions tax-exempt status
would inhibit religion by treating it like a for-profit corporation, thus almost explicitly telling citizens to donate money to secular non-profits for
tax deductions and potentially even stigmatizing religious donors as being
no better than a stockholder. State funding to public and secular private
schools, as well as tax breaks to those schools’ parents for education expenses, similarly inhibits religion by denying the religious schools and
parents of its students’ benefits simply because they teach religion in addi-

193. See id. at 552-53.
194. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (“Nothing in this national attitude toward religious tolerance and two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation has given the remotest sign of leading to an established church or religion and on the contrary it has operated affirmatively
to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief. Thus, it is hardly useful to suggest
that tax exemption is but the ‘foot in the door’ or the ‘nose of the camel in the tent’ leading to an established church. If tax exemption can be seen as this first step toward ‘establishment’ of religion, as Mr.
Justice Douglas fears, the second step has been long in coming. Any move that realistically ‘establishes’
a church or tends to do so can be dealt with ‘while this Court sits.’”).
195. Id. at 675.
196. See id. at 676-77.
197. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397-98
(1983).
198. 132 S. Ct. 694, 706-07 (2012).
199. See, e.g., id.

2014]

‘MORAL HAZARDS’ OF TITLE VII

1161

tion to the state-mandated curriculum. Finally, subjecting religious institutions’ hiring decisions, especially ones involving its ministers, to the same
standards as secular employers inhibits religion by denying religious organizations the right to employ those promoting its values and thus integrating
the government into the church as opposed to keeping them both separate. 200
An argument one commentator mentions in regard to Employment Division v. Smith is that “[t]he Court clearly was uncomfortable with evaluating the religious practices of individuals,” which actually points to a
potential issue courts would face with a heightened Title VII standard. 201
As previously mentioned, the courts have made a compromise in handling
Title VII religious accommodation cases by not inquiring into the validity
of a plaintiff’s alleged religious bona fide belief or practice in any significant way, instead focusing on the reasonableness of the accommodation.202
Thus courts would have to inquire into the validity of each plaintiff’s alleged religious belief or practice, which is something commentators agree
courts are uneasy with doing. 203 The new accommodation standards alone
raise serious Establishment Clause questions, but now so does the highly
probable new judicial inquiry of religious beliefs or practices. 204 The potential for inconsistent court rulings between majority and minority religion
plaintiffs, on whether their alleged religious belief or practice is bona fide,
raises Establishment Clause concerns, since the government could promote
certain religions at the expense of others.205 Furthermore, the fact that the
government, through the courts, is now integrating itself into each religion
by inquiring into and deciding which beliefs or practices of a religion are
bona fide raises significant Establishment Clause concerns. 206 If the courts
actually adopted a new practice of significantly inquiring into plaintiffs’
alleged beliefs, then the practice violates the Establishment Clause. Even if
a secular purpose could be found, it would be far outweighed by the judicial practice primarily advancing certain majority religions and inhibiting
lesser-known religions in combination with a newly “excessive govern-

200. See, e.g., id.
201. Blair, supra note 1, at 551-52.
202. See Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 129-30 (1st Cir. 2004); Engle, supra
note 21, at 362.
203. See, e.g., Engle, supra note 21, at 362.
204. See Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 129-30.
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 70607 (2012).
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mental entanglement” with religion in deciding the validity of religious
beliefs and practices. 207
Regardless of whether the new practice comes to fruition, a legislative
enactment or the Supreme Court could create the new standard. The Supreme Court is a highly unlikely source based on its consistent holdings on
the Title VII accommodations standards208 and the federal courts’ general
uneasiness in dealing with religion cases. 209 Therefore, Congress would
likely be the one, and the standard would likely look like the most recent
WRFA. 210
Though the previously mentioned commentators’ arguments are
somewhat strong, the WRFA, which strengthens Title VII’s religious accommodations by adopting the ADA language, would violate the Establishment Clause. 211 The purpose of the WRFA is not likely to be held as
being non-secular since it articulates the importance of religion being
helped by it. 212 Though, the WRFA could be passed along with other secular amendments, like the original 1972 amendment, the Court is likely to
still rule that the WRFA is non-secular because of the strong religious language. 213 Since the WRFA would allow plaintiffs to trump strictly enforced
neutral rules of general applicability, the WRFA would thus raise extreme
questions of whether it has the effect of the government promoting religion.
Referring back to the example where the Roman Catholic employee wore a
pro-life button at a secular accounting office with no customer interaction
and a strictly and uniformly applied policy of no buttons of any kind, the
court could hold allowing the Roman Catholic employee to wear the button
is a reasonable accommodation that does not place significant difficulty
upon the employer. 214 Add in the agnostic pro-choice employee who feels
she must reply by wearing a pro-choice button the next day. Since the employer strictly enforces the no button policy, the employer could reprimand,
demote or terminate the agnostic worker. However, the employer legally
can do nothing to the Roman Catholic employee wearing the pro-life button
207. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 550-51.
208. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook,
479 U.S. 60 (1986); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
209. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“By preserving doctrinal flexibility
and recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic application of the Religion Clauses ‘we have been
able to chart a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any
semblance of established religion. This is a ‘tight rope’ and one we have successfully traversed.’”).
210. S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012).
211. See Oleske, supra note 93, at 537.
212. See S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e (1985), invalidated by Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
213. See Thornton, 472 U.S. 703.
214. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’n, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995).
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because she is wearing it as a way of practicing her religious belief. In a
sense, the court will have ruled freedom of religion trumps freedom of
speech. WRFA would be subject to serious questions of causing the government to entangle itself with religion as the example above would give
the Roman Catholic the governmental sword to cut through the employer’s
no button policy in forcing the employer to make an exception.
2. Free Exercise Clause
With regard to the Free Exercise Clause, the commentators are mixed
on whether the clause affords them an argument in favor of raising Title
VII religious accommodation standards.215 Regardless, the Free Exercise
rights of employees would only be raised in the event heightened standards
of WRFA were enacted on its face.
The issue the commentators do not address is what kind of effect those
rights would face if the courts decided to now inquire significantly into
whether a plaintiff’s alleged religious belief or practice is bona fide. Serious questions of governmental interference would likely arise since every
denial of a plaintiff’s religious belief or practice as being bona fide could
restrict a person’s right to later assert that belief is worthy of constitutional
protection outside of work. 216 With regard to the previously-stated button
example, 217 if the court held the Roman Catholic employee’s pro-life button is not a bona fide religious practice, then questions could arise as to
whether she and other Roman Catholics can defend wearing the button in
the public square on Free Speech rights. Furthermore, unlike the ADA,
which has (yet again!) very objective standards of measuring whether
someone is disabled and to what extent, Title VII religious inquiries would
be extremely subjective and thus potentially create unequal Free Exercise
rights accorded to different religions. 218
3. Scope of Congress’ Section 5 Power
Finally, in light of City of Boerne v. Flores a heightened Title VII religious accommodation standard would likely face significant questions of
whether Congress exceeded the scope of its powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 219 Unless the state employer has a historic pattern
215. See Blair, supra note 1, at 552-55. For example, one of the commentators thinks the Employment Division v. Smith case “has left the Free Exercise Clause virtually meaningless.” Id. at 556.
216. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706-07
(2012).
217. See supra Section III.E.
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2009).
219. See 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997).
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or practice of unlawfully discriminating in the application of its neutral
laws of general applicability, a plaintiff arguing “congruence” between
Title VII’s newly heightened standard means used by Congress and the end
of ensuring religious employees practices are not restrained by strictly enforced neutral rules of general applicability would be highly questionable. 220 If the Court rules the new standard exceeds the scope of CongresCongressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then
private employees would be afforded more protection than public employees. 221
IV. COMMON SENSE RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS DOCTRINE THAT
PROMOTES WORKPLACE PEACE AND PREVENTS EMPLOYER “MORAL
HAZARDS”
Title VII should maintain its current “reasonable accommodation” and
“undue hardship” standards that an accommodation can never trump a
strictly enforced neutral rule or law of general applicability. However, certain employer-employee and Title VII religious accommodations litigation
aspects need to be uniformly altered and applied across the circuits to make
the outcomes in the employment or judicial context more cooperative, fairer, and more common-sense based. The “interactive process” within the
ADA needs to be uniformly adopted by the circuit courts for Title VII religious accommodations to minimize the amount of litigation and promote
communication between an employer and its employees. 222 The conflict
between the religious practice and the employer policy should not have to
be eliminated by the accommodation, but rather the conflict should have to
at least be resolved to the point where the “spirit” of the employer’s work
policy and the employee’s religious belief or practice is respected.223 Finally, where the religious employee worked for the employer before the conflicting policy was implemented, the employer will have to prove the
policy was implemented for rational, non-arbitrary reasons. 224
Reasonable accommodation and undue hardship standards should depend upon the amount of negotiations in good faith by both parties akin to
the ADA’s “interactive process.” 225 The more the two sides discuss their
220. See id. at 530.
221. See id.
222. See, e.g., Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2012).
223. See, e.g., United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04–CV–4237(SLT)(MDG), 2010 WL
3855191 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010).
224. See Piraino v. Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274-76 (7th Cir. 1996).
225. Compare Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2009),
with Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1473 (9th Cir. 1996).
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concerns and reasons behind their policy and religious practices, the more
likely they can find a compromise. 226 The transit authority negotiated extensively with its Muslim and Sikh employees in order to seek a compromise where its desire for uniformity and the spirit of the employees’
religious practice of wearing certain headwear could be respected. 227 Both
sides agreed the employees’ religious headwear would match the color of
the transit authority uniforms. 228
The “interactive process” is partially seen in Title VII religious accommodation cases since an employer has a duty to negotiate with the employee in good faith. 229 However, the burden upon the employee is simply
to “cooperate” with the employer after informing him of the need for an
accommodation. 230 Therefore, the religious employee’s duty is passive
since he is not required to present any real “proof” of his religious belief or
practice. 231 The employer should not be under the burden to research each
employee’s faith and guess for himself what type of an accommodation
would resolve the conflict. Instead, like in the ADA cases, the employee
should be required to bring forth the requisite information about his practice and belief, while the employer is burdened with determining a proposed accommodation based on the employee’s information. 232 The type of
information the employee should bring forth depends on the situation, but
could range from anything as small as an online link to the church’s official
site to something as formal as a letter from the “minister” of the employee’s faith. The employer’s request for any clarifying information would
have to be reasonable233 and would only arise with respect to temporal
accommodations as religious days of observance or timing of daily practic-

226. See N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 2010 WL 3855191, at *3.
227. See id.
228. See id. at *5. Note, however, that the case was in court because the negotiations reached an
impasse on the final point of whether the employees had to place a transit authority patch on their
religious headwear. Id. The conflicting transit authority uniform policy gave employees the option of
wearing no headwear at all or a transit hat. In my opinion, whether “undue hardship” is placed on the
transit authority by not having its logo on the religious employees uniform headwear is something
reasonable minds can differ upon.
229. See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1467.
230. See, e.g., Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987).
231. See id.
232. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 314 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the
plaintiff presented multiple documents the defendant-employer could use to determine a proper accommodation).
233. For accommodation, the requested clarifying information would have to be central to the
spirit of the employee’s belief or practice just like under the ADA where the employer asks for more
specifics about its employee’s disability and his doctor’s recommendations. See Rohr v. Salt River
Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2009).
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es are more set in stone. 234 In all, adopting the “interactive process” requirement into Title VII would prevent situations leaving an employer
guessing whether its employee’s hard line “complete exemption” from the
policy stance will be held as a reasonable accommodation. 235
The current Title VII requirement of the reasonable accommodation
“eliminat[ing] the conflict between employment requirements and religious
practices” 236 should not be read to eliminate the conflict, but to ensure that
the “spirit” of the employee’s religious practice and the employer’s policy
remain intact. 237 For example, in the New York Transit Authority case discussed above, the employer allowed religious headwear as long as it
matched the uniform’s colors. 238 This accommodation maintained the employer’s professional appearance and uniformity and allowed the religious
employee to maintain the spirit of their religious practice. The employer
may not obtain its logo on the employee’s headwear, but the uniformity
sought by the employer is still intact. 239 In situations where one might argue the only accommodation possible was a complete exemption from the
employer policy, typically neither party was likely creative within the “interactive process” as those all-or-nothing situations are illusory. However,
where there truly is a complete conflict, the employee and employer need
not worry since the employee will now have to prove he substantially complied with the “interactive process” under the proposed modifications, and
the employer still has the same good faith burden to prove undue hardship.
In some instances, the religious employee will be denied protection, but
under my proposal, denial would happen less often due to the “interactive
process” and even if the Title VII standards were set on par with the ADA,
there would still be some religious employees denied. 240
Another reason why religious employees’ accommodations will be
denied less often is because my proposal places a heavier burden upon
employers who implement the conflicting facially neutral policy of general
applicability after the religious employee had already been working there.

234. See Loftus v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 08–13397, 2010 WL 1139338 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 24, 2010) (ruling employee’s “desire to travel to the Holy Land for six months was based on
his personal preference rather than a religious obligation”).
235. See Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x. 581 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that an
employer made multiple attempts to accommodate pharmacist who refused to acknowledge anyone who
he thought might inquire about contraceptives).
236. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986).
237. See United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04–CV–4237(SLT)(MDG), 2010 WL
3855191 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010).
238. Id. at *5.
239. See id.
240. See Noesen, 232 F. App’x. 581.
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In order for an employer to show any accommodation would cause it undue
hardship, the employer needs to additionally prove the new neutral policy
or rule of general applicability was implemented for “proven rational, nonarbitrary reasons.” 241 The Brown case best represents this situation since
the Rastafarian employee’s role involved substantial customer service before the employer implemented a no beard policy, based on a consultant’s
recommendation, and subsequently assigned the employee to the lower
bay. 242 Under my “proven rational, non-arbitrary reasons” solution, the
employer needs to show the policy was implemented based on sound business principles, 243 has been strictly enforced since being implemented, and
the policy has caused the desired effect by show of some noticeable tangible evidence. This strong burden is placed upon the employer here because
the policy it is implementing may be “neutral,” but the policy has yet to be
proven as strictly enforced. More importantly the burden is meant to prevent the “moral hazard” an employer has to implement any facially neutral
policy it wants with the superficial rationale akin to “public image” or “uniformity”; neither of which requires any real evidence to be proven by the
employer and yet is almost impossible to disprove because those rationales
are mostly intangible and highly subjective in effect.244 Additionally, the
higher burden may help smoke out any invidious intent.
CONCLUSION
With so many rights in play within the workplace, religion is something that should be merely tolerated, not promoted or denounced. The
ADA is afforded a stronger accommodation standard due to societal and
economic concerns as well as because of the immutability of disability. A
more preferential Title VII standard could be struck down in violation of
the Establishment Clause due to the potential governmental entanglement
with religion either by affording religion a sword to cut through employers’
strictly enforced or provable neutral rules or laws of general applicability,
or by a newly strengthened judicial inquiry into deciding what aspects of
religion are bona fide. The commentators in favor of heightened standards,
while sound in some of their arguments, ultimately fail to see that at some
point an employee’s religion was a choice, and as such, should deal with

241. See Piraino v. Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274-76 (7th Cir. 1996).
242. Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15-16 (D. Mass. 2006).
243. The exact extent of what this would mean in terms of evidentiary proof or burden of proof is
beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say the consultant report in the case would be sufficient
in my opinion. See id.
244. See, e.g., Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 1185-86.
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the consequences of their actions. Title VII’s issues may be fixed with
some common sense modifications, but increasing the reasonable accommodation standard will only lead to chaos and “moral hazards” for employees.

